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Intergovernmental Power and 
Dependence* 
Ron Mock 
"(The effective intergovernmental m nager) will understand that 
intergovernmental relations are in fact intergovernmental 'negoti- 
ations' in which the parties are negotiating indead earnest for 
power, money, and problem solving responsibility." 
In this statement Allen Pritchard' has identified the 
central issue in intergovernmental management. If our 
system of intergovernmental relations (IGR) reflects, as 
Wright suggests,2 society's ongoing effort to provide a 
systematic solution to public problems, then it is of 
paramount importance that any who would understand 
IGR grasp how the triad of "power, money, and 
responsibility" are distributed among the many units of 
government. 
Money is necessary for any unit of government to 
function. If we were to draw a parallel to industry, 
money would be by far the most important of govern- 
mental raw materials. The possession of this resource 
determines largely the availability of all others, such as 
manpower or equipment. 
Problem solving responsibility corresponds to James 
Thompson's concept of domain.3 In intergovernmental 
management, domain is the claim a unit of government 
stakes out for itself in the range of problems it addresses, 
the people it serves, and the set of specific programs it 
provides. The organization establishes domain by win- 
ning consensus on its boundaries from units in its "task 
environment."4 For governments, these units include 
clients, suppliers of resources, competing agencies or 
jurisdictions, and regulatory groups (other governments 
and unions, for example). The people are the ultimate 
arbiters of domain since they can play any of the four 
roles as clients, taxpayers, private competitors, and 
voters. 
Power is the most important of the three factors in 
intergovernmental "negotiations." In IGR, power is the 
means by which a unit of government establishes and 
protects its domain. This paper will focus on power as 
the key to understanding the structure of the intergov- 
ernmental system, and the distribution of resources and 
*The author wishes to express incere appreciation to the faculty 
at Drake University who provided the encouragement eeded to 
complete this paper. My special debt of gratitude goes to 
Professor William Collins for his sponsorship and guidance of the 
effort, and to Professor Walter Roettger for his valuable and 
frank editorial critiques. 
responsibility in it.5 It will describe how power can be 
measured, strategies whereby it can be won or preserved, 
and the effects each strategic option will have on the 
intergovernmental structure. 
Power and Dependence 
This strategic model is derived from an analysis of 
power relationships developed by Richard Emerson." 
Power to control or influence the other resides in control over 
the things he values.... In short, power resides implicitly in the 
other's dependence. 
Dependence (Dab). The dependence of actor A upon actor B is 
(1) directly proportional to A's motivational investment ingoals 
mediated by B, and (2) inversely proportional tothe availability 
of those goals to A outside the A-B relation. 
The keystone to Emerson's approach is the statement 
that the power of actor B upon actor A is equal to the 
dependence of A on B. Thus, Pba=Dab. It is not enough 
to describe the relationship from A's perspective as 
Pab=Dba. We must also understand it from B's perspec- 
tive as Pba=Dab. The dynamic nature of this concept 
arises out of the possibility that A's dependence on B 
can be unequal to B's dependence upon A; and that 
either actor can take action to change a power disadvan- 
tage (being relatively more dependent upon the other) to 
a power equivalency (equal dependence on both sides) 
or even a power advantage (being relatively less depen- 
dent than the other actor). If, as several theorists have 
pointed out, power can run both ways,7 we can always 
describe a power relationship in one of the following 
three ways:8 
Pba=Dab Pba=Dab Pba=Dab 
V V II II A A 
Pab=Dba Pab=Dba Pab=Dba 
Alternatives toCompliance 
When an actor in a power relationship finds himself 
under pressure from any other actor he may yield, or he 
may adopt one or more of four strategies designed to 
Ron Mock is currently a first-year student at the University of 
Michigan School of Law. He received his MPA degree from 
Drake University in1979. 
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manipulate the power relation to retain independence. 
From his concept of dependence Emerson derives 
four alternatives to compliance.9 The first wo alterna- 
tives-developing alternative routes to the goal outside 
the power relation in question, and decreasing one's own 
motivational investment in the goals controlled by the 
other-have the effect of reducing the power of the 
threatening actor. The second two alternatives-increas- 
ing the other's motivational investment in one's own 
resources by supplying resources the other needs to 
achieve his goals, or closing off alternate sources of the 
things one currently supplies-increase one's own power 
in the relationship.' 0 
These four basic options when applied to intergovern- 
mental administration can suggest some strategies for 
governmental units in each type of power situation: 
weak, strong, or balanced. 
Strategies of the Weak 
Weak units of government can work to correct heir 
power disadvantage in several ways. 
Developing alternate routes to the goal means, of 
course, coming up with new supplies of needed re- 
sources, particularly money. It can also mean developing 
new customers or clients for the jurisdiction's products 
or services. 
It is obvious how an organization can be dependent if 
it is limited in sources of supply. A monopolistic 
supplier can easily exercise power by threatening tocut 
off vital supplies; however, an organization can be just as 
dependent on consumers of its output. Burton Clark 
illustrated this in his study of an adult education 
organization which, because it lacked secure markets, 
found itself having to cater to every fleeting whim of 
whatever clientele it could persuade to use its services.' 1
In a recent issue of Public Administration Review, 
Charles Levine suggests several tactics for building 
alternative resources: broadening the jurisdiction's reve- 
nue base; seeking support from businesses, foundations, 
or other units of government; and adopting new meth- 
ods of raising revenue, particularly user fees.' 2 Another 
tactic is embodied in the Lakewood Plan developed in 
Los Angeles County, which opened the door for smaller 
cities and special districts to contract with each other for 
municipal services as alternatives to supplying them 
themselves or going the traditional route of contracting 
with the county or the city of Los Angeles.1 3 
An indirect way to "create" new resources is cost 
reduction. Levine suggests improving productivity, auto- 
mating, and increasing hierarchical control as ways to 
economize.1 I Derived from cost reducing is Thompson's 
prediction that hard-pressed organizations will strive to 
consolidate control of those sections of their environ- 
ment over which they do enjoy power advantages. s
Increased hierarchical control over employees has a hint 
of this strategy in it; resisting unionization of employees 
is certainly within this strategy. 
Creating new clienteles is a tougher task. Good public 
relations is essential: improved productivity can be very 
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1979 
useful here, especially if accompanied by better, more 
effective performance. The objective is a three-pronged 
diversification f clients, programs, and constituents.' 6 
Decreasing motivational investment in the goals con- 
trolled by the other unit of government is a process of 
value formation, and will likely be the last resort after all 
other strategies have failed.' 7 It is ideological because it 
requires the weak party to decide it can do without he 
goal controlled by the strong, adjusting its aspirational 
values to a lower level. Jason Boe, president of the 
National Conference of State Legislatures illustrated the 
option of reduced motivational investment when he 
warned the states that if they succeeded in forcing a
balanced federal budget, "they must be aware of the 
price (in terms of less federal aid), be prepared to pay 
for it, and be willing to share responsibility for living 
with it."'1 8 
The rise of the "Big Seven" public interest 
groups (PIGs) is an example of coalition build- 
ing, especially as they work together in handling 
relations with the national government onwhom 
they depend. The effect of the Big Seven would 
be even greater were they to coordinate more 
closely their pressure on the federal government. 
The opposite strategy, increasing the strong actor's 
motivational investment in goals controlled by the weak 
actor, can be broken into two substrategies: coopting 
and contracting. Coopting is the practice of "absorbing 
new elements into the policy-determining structure of an 
organization as a means of averting threats."' 9 Thus, 
coopting involves granting something of value (status, in 
this case) to a powerful agent in order to increase his 
motivational investment in the weak unit. Here coopting 
involves a broader range of possibilities than granting 
status: in intergovernmental relations, it means making a
powerful agent dependent upon any resource over which 
the weak unit of government may have influence. A unit 
of government can coopt if it can make another unit 
dependent upon it for implementation, enforcement, or
the favorable outcome of an election. 
Contracting is the process of establishing an agree- 
ment (either formally or informally) for the exchange of 
performances in the future.' 0 It has the effect of 
institutionalizing a relationship. Contracting may not 
work to the advantage of the weak agent if its major 
effect is to make concrete a disadvantageous arrange- 
ment. If the weak unit can make the security of a 
contract important enough to the strong unit, however, 
it can balance the relationship somewhat. 
Closing off the powerful actor's alternatives i the 
final of the four basic strategies open to weak govern- 
ments in IGR. It can take two forms. 
The first is the most widely recognized: coalition 
building. If the weak unit can unite with others that are 
dependent upon the same strong unit of government, 
and if they can act as one in their dealings with the 
strong actor, they may be able to close off alternatives 
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to the latter. The rise of the "Big Seven" public interest 
groups (PIGs) is an example of coalition building, 
especially as they work together in handling relations 
with the national government on whom they depend. 
The effect of the Big Seven would be even greater were 
they to coordinate more closely their pressure on the 
federal government. 
A second option available to the weak actor for 
closing off alternatives i coercion by a countervailing 
power.' I Countervailing powers may include regulatory 
agencies or prohibitory laws. In either case, the option 
of setting up countervailing power is only open if there 
is a third party in a position to enforce compliance by 
the powerful, and if that third party can be convinced to 
undertake regulation of the powerful. In intergovern- 
mental relations, the most common source of counter- 
vailing power is the federal government. Unfortunately, 
reliance upon it by state or local governmental units may 
exacerbate their dependence upon the federal govern- 
ment. A more promising avenue from the state and local 
perspective is the states' appeal to an even higher 
authority, the Constitution, in their attempts to set 
limits on federal activity via resolutions calling for a 
constitutional convention. Or, witness the tactics of 
Moon Landrieu, former Mayor of New Orleans, when he 
threatened to deny welcome to the city to the powerful 
Congressman Hale Boggs unless he supported general 
revenue sharing.2 2 This essentially was a threat o appeal 
to the voters, one of Boggs' "regulating agents." 
Normal Strategies of the Strong 
Emerson seems to assume that once a power advan- 
tage is gained, its maintenance requires no further effort. 
Peter Blau makes no such assumption. Thus, this section 
will draw heavily upon Blau.2 
The strategies available to the strong units of govern- 
ment are, for the most part, available to the weak. For 
example, where the weak try to develop their alterna- 
tives by building sources and markets, the strong will try 
to deny these options to the weak by maintaining their 
monopoly. Monopoly maintenance tactics include en- 
forcing institutionalized hierarchical relationships, estab- 
lishing a "law" that the weak must deal with no one 
other than the strong, and contracting with the weak on 
terms that lock them into their disadvantage. Where the 
weak try to reduce their costs, the strong can impose 
costly reporting or performance r quirements. 
Where the weak try to build an ideology of "doing 
without," the strong will try to reinforce ideologies that 
place value on resources they control. In intergovern- 
mental relations, this can take the form of mandating 
protection of special populations in ways that place 
extra burdens on the weak, or building up democracy 
when the people are sympathetic to the aims of the 
strong. When the weak have not been successful in 
building ideologies of independence, the strong can 
increase their power by offering new services (upon 
which, over time, the weak will come to depend) or by 
offering special deals. The latter is especially devilish: 
once a weak unit of government has accepted a special 
deal, it has become doubly dependent since there will be 
no other equivalent arrangements available except 
through the same strong supplier or client. Whether 
intentional or not, rapid increases in grant programs 
under the Great Society aegis greatly increased national 
power, especially since so many of the grant programs 
offered special deals in the form of matching provisions. 
Where the weak try to stimulate motivational invest- 
ment on the part of the strong, the powerful will try to 
remain indifferent o what the powerless offer. One way 
to accomplish this is to maintain control over key 
intergovernmental resources, particularly money and, 
where appropriate, voters. Moreover, where the weak try 
to close off alternatives to the strong, the powerful will 
try to maintain them. Outlawing or hamstringing coali- 
tions of the weak and preventing the establishment of 
countervailing powers or restrictive rules are the princi- 
ple options here. The attempts on the part of many 
federal leaders to discourage the movement to call a 
constitutional convention is a case in point. 
Powerful units of government also have the option of 
reducing costs as a means of reducing dependence on 
others. It seems safe, however, to predict that this tactic 
will be employed less by the powerful than by the weak, 
since the powerful inherently are more likely to have an 
abundance of resources. 
Strategies of Equals 
Just as the strong will try to increase their strength, 
the parties to a perfectly balanced relationship will try 
to make their positions more secure. Some of the 
strategies available to them have the effect of stabilizing 
equal-power relationships, others have the effect of 
gaining a power advantage. 
Most of the strategies for equals can easily be derived 
from the discussions of those available to the weak and 
the strong; however, significant implications for inter- 
governmental management in some of the equal-power 
strategies will be highlighted here. 
Even though a governmental unit in a symmetrical 
power relationship has by definition adequate alterna- 
tives in suppliers and clients, it must maintain readiness 
to react should its environment change to its detriment. 
We might expect, for example, that under favorable conditions 
the organization would practice exchanging with each of its 
several possible sources, thus establishing with each a precedent 
for support if conditions become less favorable.2 4 
The same treatment would be expected for client 
groups. States and localities in this condition can be 
expected to get key personnel out of federally-paid 
positions. Further, governmental units in equal-power 
balance will keep the doors open to coalitions and will 
maintain good public relations, in case the force of a 
united front or an appeal to the voters is ever needed to 
forestall a takeover by an emerging powerful actor. 
Contracting can play a very important role among 
equals. By establishing contracts, equals ensure the 
continuation into the future of the relatively favorable 
arrangement of the present. They also forestall dalliance 
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by their equals with alternative suppliers and clients and 
the accompanying threat that they will provide the 
competitor with a power advantage. 
One other strategy should be noted. Governmental 
units dissatisfied with equal-power arrangements may be 
able to increase their power by initiating new pro- 
grams.2 6 This is how the ephemeral resource of superior 
leadership can be translated into concrete power advan- 
tages. 
Devolving Strategies of the Strong 
It would be tempting to assume that the strong will 
always want to increase their power advantage. It is also 
conceivable, however, that there may come a movement 
in intergovernmental management for the stronger units 
of government to reduce their power advantages volun- 
tarily. 
That such a strategy can emerge was graphically 
demonstrated when President Eisenhower sought to 
decentralize powers to the states in the late 1950s by 
creating a high-level task force to suggest areas of federal 
responsibility that could be delegated to the states. The 
effort failed. Morton Grodzins asserts that no such effort 
could ever succeed.2 7 According to power-dependence 
analysis, however, there are a wide variety of strategies 
the powerful might employ to reduce their own power 
advantages. This condition would arise should leaders be 
elected to head the strong unit who were ideologically 
committed to a more equal distribution of intergovern- 
mental power. Such a commitment might arise, for 
example, out of a belief that the safeguards provided by 
"balance of powers" are endangered when one unit or 
type of units dominates, or it could stem from a belief 
that innovation and responsiveness can be maximized in 
a power-balance system. 
In intergovernmental relations, the most com- 
mon source of countervailing power is the 
federal government. Unfortunately, reliance up- 
on it by state or local governmental units may 
exacerbate their dependence upon the federal 
government. 
These strategies consist of the strong helping the 
strategies of the weak to succeed. Thus, when the weak 
try to build their resources, the strong can help by 
reducing their share of the resources they hold in 
common. For example, they might reduce their own tax 
rates, grant tax deductions for taxes paid to weak 
governmental units, or even shift their tax base entirely 
to eliminate tax competition with the weak. Private 
grants or investment in the weak can be stimulated by 
the strong. The strong can also help the weak take power 
over other elements of their environment. For instance, 
unions might be restricted in their dealings with weaker 
units of government, or minimum wage or other 
regulations might be eased for weaker units. 
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1979 
One of the most promising strategies would be to 
help the weak reduce the costs of their operations. 
Reducing performance r quirements for the weak is one 
possibility; even more useful would be assistance with 
management training and capacity building. If these last 
two efforts are successful enough, there would be 
beneficial impacts throughout the weaker agent's organi- 
zation, including increases in the ability and popular 
support necessary to assume more program responsibili- 
ties. 
There is little a stronger unit of government can do to 
encourage the weak to develop ideologies of doing 
without. That is an internal process and cannot be 
forced on anyone. About all that the strong can do to 
help this process is to hold off on offering new resources 
or special deals. 
The strong can act to make themselves more depen- 
dent on the weak. Following up on Terry Sanford's 
observation that every level of government depends on 
every other level of government to get its job done,2 8 
the strong unit can increase its dependence by giving 
away responsibilities important o its own functioning. 
Enforcement of laws is one vital function commonly 
carried out by a different unit of government than the 
one that made the laws. 
One interesting idea might be an adaptation of the 
coopting process. If the strong were to create advisory 
boards made up of representatives of the weak and allow 
them to have input on the actions of the strong, 
balancing of the power relationship should take place. 
The strong would to some degree have limited its own 
options by allowing itself only those options approved 
(or not too strenuously condemned) by the weak. The 
movement on the part of some states to assert rights to 
appropriate federal money coming into the state is a 
variation on this theme. Suggestions for state-federal, 
local-federal or local-state commissions to study or 
advise on this or that are also variations on the coopting 
theme.2 
The final broad strategy of devolving power would be 
to allow one's own options to be cut. President Carter's 
freezes on federal hiring and his attempts to cut federal 
spending are examples of this strategy whether or not 
they were meant to be. Proponents at the federal level of 
limiting federal spending are intentionally pursuing this 
strategy. Robert Newton's suggestion for a conscious 
practice of "administrative f deralism" isalso a variation 
on the theme inasmuch as it would delineate more 
strictly the federal role Congress intends and prevent any 
expansion of that role by the executive branch.3 0 
At the state level, states finding themselves with an 
excessive power advantage over local governments can 
grant home rule options with the most flexible provi- 
sions possible. 
Granted, many of these strategies for devolution 
would be unpopular with some elements of the political 
system. It is not "normal" for anyone to give up power 
willingly. If the decision were ever made, however, to 
spread intergovernmental power around more equally, 
This content downloaded from 209.170.255.14 on Thu, 05 Mar 2015 17:31:54 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
560 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW 
these would be some of the options available. 
Cohesion 
Emerson defines cohesion in power relations as 
Dab + Dba 31 Operations based on the principle of 
2 
reducing the dependence of one party on another have 
the effect of reducing cohesion, while those that increase 
the dependence of one on the other increase cohesion. 
Cohesion can be affected in either direction by the 
actions of any member in a power relation: weak, 
strong, or equal. 
In intergovernmental management the factor of cohe- 
sion has important implications. First, all else being 
equal, the higher the cohesion the less the independence. 
Thus cohesion has to be kept in mind for those planning 
to use IGR as a tool to achieve some political purpose. If 
coordinated action by several governments i required, 
then strategies should be chosen that increase cohesion; 
that is, when manipulating the power balance, the 
strategist should emphasize those options that serve to 
increase power rather than to decrease dependence. On 
the other hand, if flexibility and freedom for isolated 
experimentation is needed, the strategist should use 
options that reduce dependence more than those that 
increase the other's dependence. 
A second consideration to be borne in mind is that, 
especially in balanced situations, partners in highly 
cohesive power relations must be carefully watched. An 
agency locked into a highly cohesive bond has to be 
sensitive to factors in the partner's environment as well 
as in its own, since changes imposed on the partner from 
a third party may very likely change the reciprocal 
balance in the highly cohesive relationship. 
Intergovernmental Implications 
Finally, power-dependence analysis can predict what 
structural effects each kind of power-manipulating stra- 
tegy will have. When governmental units are trying to 
develop their own alternatives, there will be a rise in 
competition for resources and for clients. Since this 
operation will only become dominant when sources of 
supply and customers or clients are relatively plentiful, 
there should be an expansion in government services. 
Note that this does not mean the struggle over resources 
will cease in times of government cutback; rather, in 
situations approaching "free market" competition, the 
role of government will be under pressure to expand as 
the various units of government try to improve their 
power position by developing alternate resources and 
clients. 
When governmental units are moving to reduce their 
own motivational investment in goals mediated by 
others, there will be a developing ideology of indepen- 
dence and a sense of limits. There should be reductions 
in governmental activity when this strategy isdominant. 
Units of government that are trying to increase the 
motivational investment in the relationship on the part 
of other governments should be involved in the creation 
and distribution of resources and services, especially 
those directed at other units of government. There will 
be increases in intergovernmental exchange when this 
strategy isin the fore. 
Finally, when governmental units are moving to deny 
alternatives to other units, there will be serious tructur- 
al impacts. When the weak are advancing, there will be 
structural changes as they succeed in forming coalitions 
and setting up countervailing powers. If, however, the 
weak are not advancing, there will be structural ossifica- 
tion as the strong reinforce and institutionalize the 
status quo. 
Conclusion 
When historians write about the decade of the 70s, they 
undoubtedly will chronicle the transition of the public sector 
from a "do anything at any cost" era at the beginning of the 
decade to an "era of limits" at the approach of the 80s.3 2
If this comment from a recent issue of Public Admini- 
stration Review is correct, then the concepts developed 
in these pages are of immediate importance to the public 
administrator having to cope with intergovernmental 
issues. It becomes vital that there be some tool available 
to judge what is going to happen to the intergovernmen- 
tal system and how each administrator involved can best 
prepare his agency and its environment to handle the 
changing power relations. The scheme presented here 
does not purport o be completely developed. It would 
be improved by including analysis of the internal politics 
of the governmental organization, although in a more 
analytical context than has been done here.3' It does, 
however, represent one approach for administrators and 
theorists seeking a better understanding ofthe dynamics 
of intergovernmental relationships and of the strategies 
available to maximize service to society in the midst of a 
system in flux. 
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Alternatives nate sources nate sources coalitions of share of common -Expansion of 
-Build alter- and clienteles others resources government 
nate clienteles open -Forestall re- -Nurture alternate services 
-Reduce costs -Reduce costs strictive resources for the 
-Control other -Be alert to regulation weak 
elements in changes in -Reduce costs -Shield weak from 
environment close others their environment 
-Help weak 
reduce costs 
Decreasing Build ideology Maintain readi- Remain indiffer- Refrain from offer- Declines -Sense of limits Scarcity 
Motivational of doing ness to do ent to what ing new programs -Reduction of 
Investment without without others offer to weak government 
role 
Increasing -Contract -Take initiative -Maintain -Give away vital Grows -Exchange Plenty Others' -Coopt -Contract ideology valu- responsibilities -Growth of 
Motivational ing things -Create advisory intergovern- Investment under own groups repre- mental activity 
control senting weak 
-Offer new 
services 
-Offer special 
deals 
Denying -Build -Contract -Maintain -Limit own Grows -Structural Scarcity 
Alternatives coalitions -Keep doors monopoly authority and change (weak to Others -Build counter- open to coali- -Contract resources advancing) 
vailing power tion, appeal -Institution- -Give home-rule -Structural 
to voters alize options ossification 
hierarchy (weak not 
advancing) 
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